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COGNITIVE FACULTIES, COGNITIVE PROCESSES,
AND THE HOLY SPIRIT IN PLANTINGA'S
WARRANT SERIES.
Andrew Dole

In Warranted Christian Belief; Alvin Plantinga argues that much of what
Christians believe may well amount to knowledge. His argument for this
claim is based on the criterion for warrant developed in Warrant: the Current
Debate and Warrant and Proper Function. However, while in the first two volUlnes of the series this criterion was applied exclusively to human cognitive
faculties, the argument of the third volume depends on the principle that the
criterion can be applied to cognitive processes in general. I argue, by means of
counterexamples, that cognitive processes will not necessarily produce warranted beliefs even if they satisfy the criterion for warrant as this applies to
cognitive faculties. After a discussion of one proposal to address this problem,
I offer a solution which avoids the claim that beliefs produced by the Internal
Instigation of the Holy Spirit are warranted because they satisfy Plantinga's
criterion for warrant, but reaches behind the criterion to find the warrant for
such beliefs to be a direct result of their origin in God.

I
In the first two volumes of his Warrant series, Alvin Plantinga developed a

general criterion for warrant, the property which makes a case of true belief
into a case of knowledge. In the third book of the series, he argues that
much of what Christians believe may well be warranted according to the
same criterion. However, between the second and third volumes of the
series, a major alteration takes place in the use of the criterion. Whereas the
criterion was formulated, in the first two volumes, with reference to beliefs
produced by internal human cognitive faculties, Plantinga now takes it to
apply to beliefs produced by cognitive processes in general. The proposal of
the third volume of the series hinges upon this broadening of the range of
application of the criterion, for the beliefs which Plantinga argues may well
be items of knowledge for Christians are produced, not by human cognitive
faculties, but by a cognitive process iIlstigated by the Holy Spirit.
I will argue that it cannot simply be assumed that a criterion which
determines whether beliefs produced by cognitive faculties are warranted
can perform the same function with respect to cognitive processes.
Cognitive faculties are a subset of the set of cognitive processes, a subset
whose members we are to a certain extent familiar and comfortable with.
But the larger set of imaginable cognitive processes contains members
which bear little if any resemblance to our own cognitive faculties. A belief
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produced by a non-faculty cognitive process which meets the criterion for
warrant may well suffer from defects sufficient to suggest that the belief
should not be considered warranted.
II

To begin the argument, let's briefly recall Plantinga's criterion for warrant
as it is found at the beginning of Warrant and Proper Function .
.. as I see it, a belief has warrant for me only if (1) it has been produced
in me by cognitive faculties that are working properly (functioning as
they ought to, subject to no cognitive dysfunction) in a cognitive
environment that is appropriate for my kinds of cognitive faculties,
(2) the segment of the design plan governing the production of that
belief is aimed at the production of true beliefs, and (3) there is a high
statistical probability that a belief produced under those conditions
will be true.'
This criterion is offered in a shortened form in Warranted Christian Belief
Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that
belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly
(subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan
that is successfully aimed at truth. '
How does Plantinga understand the sbift in the criterion's application?
The first explicit mention of this shift occurs in an exchange with Keith
Lehrer which took place during the interval before the publication of WCB.
Lehrer argues that "on Plantinga's account [as found in WPFj it is beyond
the power of anyone, even God, to bypass our usual cognitive faculties and
give us knowledge". Plantinga responds, "can't J take tbis to be a special
limiting case of cognitive faculties or belief-producing processes functioning properly? God instills a true belief in you, intending in doing so to
instill in you a true belief. Why can't I think of his doing that as itself a
belief-producing process, especially since that is precisely what it is? True,
this belief isn't exactly produced by a cognitive faculty, or at least by one of
my cognitive faculties; but it is produced by a properly functioning cognitive process, and I think that's sufficient." 3
This gives us some understanding of what Plantinga means by a 'cognitive process': roughly, any process which results in the existence of a belief
in an individual. While a formal definition or detailed description of cognitive processes is not offered in WCB, Plantinga classifies tbe particular
activity of the Holy Spirit producing beliefs in individuals as a cognitive
process under the following rubric: it is "a cognitive device, a means by
which belief, and belief on a certain specific set of topics, is regularly produced in regular ways"; commenting in a footnote, "Although this regularity is typical of cognitive processes, it isn't really necessary"." So the class
of cognitive processes turns out to be quite broad; in fact, about the only
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feature which a thing must have to qualify as a cognitive process is the feature that it produces a belief."
Now the notion that the criterion for warrant could have 'extensions' is
not introduced for the first time in WCB. At the close of Warral1t: The
Current Debate, Plantinga discusses the possibility of such extensions:
What 1 propose to explain and explore is our notion of warrant, a
notion nearly all of us have and employ in our everyday pursuits.
The notion is not best explained, I think, just by producing a set of
severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions .... What we really
have are paradigms: central, clear, and unequivocal cases of knowledge and warrant. But there is also a sort of prenumbral zone of possibJe cases surrounding the central cases; these cases don't conform
exactly to the conditions characterizing the central cases, but are
instead related by way of analogical extension and similarity ....
Accordingly, a good way to characterize our notion of warrant
(more precisely: our system of analogically related concepts of warrant) is to specify the conditions governing the central paradigmatic
core (here necessary and sufficient conditions are appropriate)
together with some of the analogicaJ extensions and an explanation
of the analogical basis for the extension."
On this model, what is offered in Warrant and Proper FUllction is not a criterion for warrant as such: rather, it is a criterion for the central core of 'our
notion of warrant'. The shift from cognitive faculties to cognitive processes, I suggest, is best seen as an 'analogical extension' of the core criterion
for warrant. The basis for the extension, then, is the analogy (similarity)
between cognitive faculties and cognitive processes; and Plantinga appears
to hold that these two are similar enough that the core criterion for warrant
can be applied without alteration to cognitive processes in general.
The non-faculty cogniti\·e process which is at the heart of Warranted
Christian Belief is the "internal instigation (or testimony) of the Holy Spirit",
which I'll refer to in this essay as the IIHS. This process, which (by hypothesis) produces belief in the truths of Christianity, is described as the middle
tier of a larger, three-tiered cognitive process. The first tier is Scripture,
which contains the truths \'\'hich God has revealed to humankind. The
final tier is faith, or (in Calvin's words) "a firm and certain knowledge of
God's benevolence towards us ... both revealed to our minds and sealed
upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit". The middle tier involves the
activity of the Holy Spirit causing, on the occasion of a person's encountering one of the truths of Christianity in Scripture, the belief that the proposition in question is true (as well as a correlated affective response).'
In light of this description of tl1e IlHS, I think a brief word is in order
about how the core criterion is to be understood. As stated, the criterion
requires that the cognitive environment be appropriate for my kind of cognitive faculties, even though the criterion, as stated, doesn't restrict the cognitive faculties in question to my cognitive faculties.' In practice, however,
the relevant cognitive environment for the determination of warrant is
determined with reference to the particular cognitive faculty being exer-
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cised." So it seems to me that the criterion should be understood as requiring a link between the (types of) cognitive faculties under consideration
and the cognitive environments whose suitability is required. The core criterion deals with my cognitive faculties and requires that the cognitive
environment be suitable for my kinds of cognitive faculties; the 'analogical
extension' will consist of shift from a concern with my cognitive faculties
and the environments relevant to their exercise to a concern with cognitive
processes and the environments relevant to their exercise.
If it is correct to see the comparison between our cognitive faculties
(memory, introspection, sense perception, and so on) and the IIHS as based
on an analogy between cognitive faculties and non-faculty cognitive processes, then the claim which is at issue is an 'Analogical Extension to Processes':
(AEP)

Cognitive processes which are not cognitive faculties will be
warrant-conferring just in case they satisfy the conditions for
warrant as these apply to cognitive faculties.

Now (AEP) is a broad claim indeed, and one might wonder if Plantinga
does indeed hold such a position. On examination, the project of WeB
seems to turn on this principle, or some principle like it. 10 But its breadth is
growLds for concern. One suspects that there will be cases in which (AEP)
will pronounce as warranted beliefs which there are good reasons to think
ought not be pronounced warranted. This is precisely what I will argue.
III

The strategy I'll be pursuing is to offer examples of non-faculty cognitive
processes which satisfy principle (AEP) but are exotic enough that we
should have doubts about whether they could produce knowledge. The
examples will grow increasingly baroque as the essay progresses, and in
fact more exotic examples than the ones I'll present are conceivable. A few
examples should be enough to make the point.

Here There Be Elephants. The first example makes use of a cognitive
process described by Plantinga himself.
Suddenly and without your knowledge you are transported to an
environment wholly different from earth; you awake on a planet
revolving around Alpha Centauri. There conditions are quite different; elephants, we may suppose, are invisible to human beings, but
emit a sort of radiation .... Imagine that the radiation emitted causes
human beings to form the belief... that there is a large grey object in
the neighborhood. Again, an elephant wanders by; while seeing
nothing of any particular interest, you suddenly find yourself with
the belief that there is a large grey object nearby. A bit perplexed at
this discovery, you examine your surroundings more closely: you
still see no large grey object. Your faculties are displaying no malfunction ... you are not being epistemically careless or slovenly; never-
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theless you don't know that there is a large grey object nearby. The
belief has little by way of warrant for you ....
And the reason is not far to seek: it is that your cognitive faculties
and the environment in which you find yourself are not properly
attuned. ll

Plantinga describes this case, at the outset of his second volume, as an
example of the production of unwarranted beliefs. However, once the criterion for warrant is expanded to include belief forming processes, the
beliefs produced in this example will be warranted, provided that one
small addition is made to the description.
Suppose that the radiation emitted by Alpha Centauri elephants produces the belief that a large grey object is in the neighborhood within all
animals in close proximity to elephants, and does so reliably (most of the
time). More specifically, suppose this process had been designed to produce
such beliefs '2- for the purpose of scaring away competitors for food,
predators, or animals susceptible of being damaged if stepped on. In this
case we could clearly say that, were a human to be haplessly transported to
this planet, his belief that there is a large grey animal in the neighborhood
would be warranted according to (AEP), and if held strongly enough,
would constitute knowledge. It would be (1) produced by a properly functioning cognitive process (the process produces such beliefs when functioning properly), within an appropriate cognitive environment (the
process is designed to function upon animals on Alpha Centauri); (2) the
segment of the design plan governing the process is directly aimed at the
production of true beliefs; and (3) the design plan is a good one, since we
are supposing that the radiation succeeds most of the time in producing
the requisite belief.
Note that the reason Plantinga gives for denying that such beliefs have
warrant- that "your cognitive faculties and the environment in which you
find yourself are not properly attuned"- would be, in effect, overruled by
the broadening specified by (AEP). If cognitive processes in general can be
warrant-conferring, there is no need whatsoever for my cognitive faculties
to be properly attuned to the cognitive environment (local or global) for me
to have warranted beliefs. 13

Brain-in-a- V{It 1. Suppose you are a brain in a vat, with your nerve-endings hooked up to electric wires in the traditional manner. Suppose further
that the scientists who are responsible for your well-being have devised the
following procedure. A technician sits at a console beside the vat in which
you reside, watching a small screen on which symbols flash periodically.
Whenever the symbol 'n' appears on the screen, the technician presses a
button marked 'n' on the control panel. This button activates a complicated algorithm whose termination is the production of a belief in your noetic
structure that the symbol 'n' is appearing on a screen somewhere.
This belief, too, would be warranted under the analogical extension of
the core criterion to cognitive processes generally, and if held strongly
enough would constitute knowledge. As in the Alpha Centauri case, it
would be (1) produced by a properly functioning cognitive process (the
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process produces such beliefs when functioning properly), within an
appropriate cognitive environment (the process is designed to function in
brain-in-a-vat cases); (2) the segment of the design plan governing the
process would be directly aimed at the production of true beliefs; and (3)
the design plan would be a good one, since the process generally succeeds
in producing the desired belief in you.

Brain-in-a-Vat 2. Suppose that the technician is still responding to the
symbol 'n' on the screen, but the button on the console is not marked 'n'
but 'Feike', and suppose that pressing the button produces a belief in you
that 'Feike is a Frisian'. Furthermore, suppose Feike is in fact a Frisian- he
is chief scientist on the project, designer of the whole experiment, and
everyone involved knows (is warranted in believing and believes firmly)
that he is a Frisian.
Once again, the belief in question would be (1) produced by a properly
functioning cognitive process, within an appropriate cognitive environment; (2) the segment of the design plan governing the process would be
directly aimed at the production of true beliefs; and (3) the design plan
would be a good one, since it would in fact produce true beliefs. So in this
case as well, your belief would be warranted under (AEP).
Braill-in-a-Vat 3. Suppose there is not just one belief-producing button
on the console but many, each with its own label, and each one producing
a true belief in you- one produces the belief 'Feike is a Frisian', another
produces the belief 'Kant rarely left Konigsberg', still another '-(P&-P)"
and so on. Suppose that whenever the symbol'n' appears on the computer
screen, the technician presses one of these buttons at random, thereby producing in you a true belief.
These beliefs will not be 'accidentally' true; each proposition will have
been carefully examined and approved by a crack team of philosophers,
geographers, logicians and so on. These beliefs would, according to (AEP),
be warranted- they would be (1) produced by a properly functioning
cognitive process, within an appropriate cognitive environment, according
to (2) a segment of a design plan directly aimed at the production of true
beliefs; and (3) the design plan would be a good one (there would be a high
statistical probability that the beliefs so produced would be true).
Braill-in-a-Vat 4. Suppose the many true-belief-producing buttons on
the console are arranged in linear fashion, much like a piano keyboard,
each again with its own label, and (we may suppose) each producing a
tone of a certain pitch (designed to indicate to Feike, whose bench is in the
next room, what you believe at any given moment). Further, suppose that
the night-shift technician invites some of his friends to come around one
night and see what he does for a living, and that once they arrive he sits
down at the console, rolls up his sleeves, and announces that he is about to
produce some true beliefs in you (who are all this time helplessly floating
in the vat). Thereupon he begins to play selections from Rigoletto upon the
true-belief-producing buttons, whilst singing at the top of his lungs.
Finally, suppose our technician has only fair to middling talents as a
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pianist, often missing the specific keys he intends to press.
In this case as well, each of the beliefs produced in you will be (1) produced by a properly functioning cognitive process within an appropriate
cognitive environment; (2) governed by a design-plan segment directly
aimed at truth (the teclmician's declared intent is, after all, to produce true
beliefs in you); and (3) the design plan would be a good one, evinced by
the fact that all the beliefs produced would be non-accidentally true. So in
this case as well, application of (AEP) would result in the conclusion that
these beliefs would be warranted, and if held firmly enough would constitute knowledge.
IV

Now all of these examples involve cases where (AEP) is satisfied; and yet I
take it that few would think that the beliefs produced in all of the examples ought to be thought of as warranted. The examples trade on the fact
that there are very many imaginable cognitive processes which are so different from human cognitive faculties that it is difficult to imagine any situation in which we would be willing to grant that these processes could
produce what we think of as knowledge, even if the requirements of the
core criterion for warrant were met. Certainly, more exotic examples than
those I've presented above are imaginable; so certainly, (AEP) needs to be
qualified in some way.
Now it seems to me that the move from cognitive faculties to cognitive
processes shouldn't be rejected outright; that is, I think it's likely that there
are imaginable non-faculty cognitive processes whose deliverances, in
cases where the core criterion for warrant is met, might plausibly be
thought of as cases of knowledge, and in the end the IlHS might well tum
out to be one of these. But the claim that the IIHS does fall within this class
is somewhat hollow if we cannot say what distinguishes non-faculty cognitive processes which might well produce warranted beliefs (when the core
criterion for warrant is satisfied) from those which look as though their
deliverances should not be considered candidates for knowledge.
So it seems to me that the counterexamples expose a gap in Plantinga's
argument. If this is conceded, there are two ways to respond to the problem. The first involves deploying further argumentative resources to close
this gap, arguing that a restricted version of (AEP) can be derived which
the IIHS satisfies. The second involvcs looking for an alternativc to
reliance on (AEP) or any similar principle to secure the claim that beliefs
produced by the IIHS can be warranted. I'll spend some time outlining
what I think the first response would involve before recommending the
second as the more profitable of the two.
One could attempt to derive a restricted form of (AEP) along the following lines. It's reasonable to think that cognitive processes which are similar
to human cognitive processes will be more likely to produce knowledge
when they satisfy the core criterion for warrant than those which are not.
Probably not all of the features of cognitive faculties are relevant to the
determination of warrant; it may well make no difference whether a faculty is part of our 'original equipment' or is acquired with experience or
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implanted by God, for example-so we will want to say that a non-faculty
cognitive process must be relevantly similar to human cognitive faculties if
its deliverances are to be acknowledged as possibly warranted. That is, it
is likely that there are certain features of cognitive faculties which account
for the fact that their deliverances, where the core criterion is satisfied, are
warranted; and the lack of some or all of these features is what accounts for
the fact that very exotic cognitive processes are not likely to produce warranted beliefs even when they satisfy the core criterion.
So what is needed is a grasp of which features of our human cognitive
faculties are essential for the purpose of producing warranted beliefs.
Assuming we could somehow derive a list of such features, a broader criterion for warrant could then be constructed: for a non-faculty cognitive
process to produce warranted beliefs, it would have to exhibit the relevant
features as well as satisfy the core criterion. With such a broader criterion
in hand, all that would remain would be the argument that the IIH5
exhibits the necessary features.
It's not clear to me that such an argument could be mounted; certainly,
it would involve quite a bit of work with no guarantee of success. To individuate our cognitive faculties and identify the features of each one is no
small task; Plantinga himself admits that an adequate treatment of anyone
faculty would require substantial careful work. 14 Further, as Plantinga
himself notes, there is no agreement on the extent of 'our cognitive establishment'.L' While there is agreement among some parties to isolate certain
of the more important faculties for the purpose of philosophical treatment,
very different accounts have been offered of the makeup of these faculties.
So it would not be easy to produce a list of our cognitive faculties and their
various features which would not itself be subject to dispute, and thus of
limited usefulness for the purpose of defending the claim that Christian
belief can be warranted. Furthermore, it is not at all clear what procedure
one would follow to distinguish features which are essential to the conferral of warrant upon a faculty's productions, and which inessential. Now
certainly if the project appears interesting, then hands will be found to do
the necessary work; this way of attempting to close the gap might very
well succeed in the end. But such a project could barely even be started in
the present essay.

v
But is such a response, after all, so much as needed? Just where does the
objection that not all cognitive processes which satisfy the core criterion
will produce warranted beliefs leave the project of Warranted Christian
Belief. Is the 'gap' which I've attempted to point out really a threat to
Plantinga's aims?
Let's recall the fact that the argument which Planting a is most concerned to offer in the third volume is, in the end, an unresolved conditional, essentially:
(A)

If Christianity is true, and if God has instituted something
like the IIH5 as a way of informing believers about the great
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truths of the Gospel, then a good bit of what Christians
believe may well be warranted.
The intent of this conditional is to show that any de jure objections
against Christian beliefs collapse into the de facto objection: that is, if the
conditional is true, then the only way to demonstrate that Christian belief
suffers, in every case, from certain defects other than falsity (irrationality,
lack of warrant, and so on) is to demonstrate that Christian beljef is false. 16
Now the argument presented here doesn't show that the conditional is
false; but it does add a further specification to the conditional which must
be satisfied if the de facto and de jure arguments are to be successfully collapsed. If the defense of the IIHS suggested above were to be undertaken,
it might be discovered in the end that the IIHS does possess the relevant
features of cognitive faculties which are necessary to insure that its productions can be warranted; so it might well turn out that, if the antecedents of
Plantinga's conditional is true, then the consequent is true also. But as stated, (A) lacks one necessary condition. The argument I've presented should
be seen as revising (A) to read:
(B)

If Christianity is true, and if God has instituted something
like the IIHS as a way of informing believers about the great
truths of the Gospel, and if something like the IIHS is relevantly similar" to human cognitive faculties for the purposes of determining warrant, then a good bit of what Christians
believe may well be warranted.

Now this is hardly a crushing blow to Plantinga's project; but it should
be noted that the new condition in (B) differs from the original one in two
important respects. Both the claim that Christianity is true and that God
instills faith in some individuals are consonant with the Reformed
Christian tradition. But the claim that the sort of divine activity specified
by the IIHS is similar to human cognitive faculties in important but
unspecified respects is not a claim which has the backing of any significant
part of the Christian or philosophical traditions. Further, while the truth of
the first condition (the truth of Christianity) not only makes the truth of the
second condition possible but in fact makes it rather likely, it does not
seem to me that the truth of Christianity or the existence of something like
the IIHS would make it more likely that the IlHS would have the requisite
set of features in common with our cognitive faculties than if the IIHS
'existed only in the understanding'. If the gap in the argument is to be
closed, it looks as though more in the way of argument will be needed than
the supposition of the truth of Christianity, or even the truth of Plantinga's
"extended Aquinas-Calvin model" of faith.'s
Now a rejoinder is possible here. One might think that the gap which I
claim to have pointed out- between the claim that cognitive faculties
which satisfy the core criterion for warrant will produce warranted beliefs,
and the claim that a cognitive process carried out by God upon an individual will do the same- doesn't amount to much at all, when viewed in
light of the supposition that the cognitive agent in question is, after all,
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God. Can't what we know about God--{)mnipotence, omniscience, and so
on-assuage any worries that we might have about the epistemic stahlS of
beliefs produced directly by God in an individual? Do we really need the
argument that such beliefs would be warranted to be airtight to believe,
reasonably, that they would be warranted? If Plantinga's argument gets us
close to seeing how such beliefs can constitute knowledge, can't we just say
that something like the IIHS will just not suffer from any of the defects
which we can imagine characterizing very exotic cognitive processes,
because God possesses all perfections and no defects?
I think that this is broadly correct; it seems to me that, if we are supposing the truth of Christianity, beliefs produced by something like the IIHS
will be highly desirable epistemically. But let me point out that such a
response does not close the gap in Plantinga's argument, but jumps it, leaving it in place. It amounts to saying, in essence, "well, we know not how,
but we trust that God's power (and omniscience) is enough to jump this
gap and give us warranted beliefs". Relying on such a proposition at this
important juncture would certainly be out of step with the rest of
Plantinga's argument; it seems to me that it would amount to giving faith
not only the last, but the strategically crucial-but somewhat impreciseword in what is otherwise a rigorous philosophical argument.
VI

There is a way, however, to give the sentiments expressed in this response
a bit more in the way of philosophical backbone. It seems to me that resting the claim that the IIHS produces warranted beliefs on principle (AEP)
is problematic enough that, if a more elegant way to accomplish the same
aim can be found, then the better part of valor would be to abandon it.
And there are resources within Plantinga's own work on whose basis one
could defend the epistemic merits of beliefs produced by something like
the IJHS without appeal to a principle like (AEP). What I have in mind
involves not an alteration of the core criterion for warrant, but a readjustment of the central paradigm of knowledge, based on an appreciation of
what the Christian tradition tells us about God and of the differences
between human and divine knowledge.
In his article entitled "Divine Knowledge", published in the same year
as the first two volumes of the Warrant series, Plantinga addresses the rclation between human and divine knowledge. One difference, he argues, is
that the process whereby human beings come to have warranted beliefs
requires supposing that human cognitive faculties have been designed to
function in a certain way; but no such supposition is to be thought necessary with respect to God's knowledge. In fact, our having any knowledge
at all-our being designed at all, for example-depends on God's knowing
how to design beings with reliable cognitive faculties, and knowing how to
set up a world of things that could be known by such beings. An important difference between God and us is that our knowledge presupposes
knowledge on the part of someone else; his does not."l'i
Furthermore, unlike our knowledge, God's knowledge doesn't come by
way of Ifollowing the causal channels' according to which the world runs.
1/
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Plantinga puts the point thus: "Our knowledge ... is indeed derivative; and
it goes by way of the various causal structures and channels God has established .... But [Cod's] knowledge does not go by way of these causal connections (or any other); Cod's knowledge precedes the causal connections in
the world."20 And in exploring the question of whether there's anything
equivalent to the regular functioning of cognitive faculties in Cod's case,
Plantinga concludes: "if in an analogical sense we say that there is a way
in which Cod's knowledge works, then, so far as we can see, that way is
given by his being necessarily omniscient"."
According to this account, God's knowledge is not subject to any of the
restrictions to which our knowledge is subject, and God's knowledge is a
precondition for our knowledge in several ways. This picture suggests a
way of understanding the relation between divine and human knowledge
which offers an alternative to the defense of the IIHS suggested above. I
would like to say (perhaps tugging on a fugitive stand of Christian
Platonism in Reformed thought) that this picture suggests that Cod's
knowledge is a higher form of knowledge than human knowledge. God's
knowledge is superior to our own in its range, presumably the certainty
with which it is held, and its accuracy with respect to the details of what is
known; and our knowledge is essentially dependent upon God's knowledge. Without God's knowledge (superior to our own) of the things which
we know and other things, we could know nothing.
Why do I think this is relevant to the project of the Warrant series? Well,
Plantinga understands warrant to be a matter of a belief's credentials.
Throughout the three volumes of the series, these credentials have been
lmderstood with reference to the ways in which humans ordinarily come
to know things; satisfying the core criterion for warrant is a way of displaying good epistemic credentials. But according to the picture sketched
just above, items of God's knowledge, even though they do not (so far as
we know) come by way of properly-functioning cognitive faculties in Cod,
have far better credentials than any of our own beliefs could ever have.
Cod's beliefs don't have to satisfy any criteria to count as items of knowledge. Any belief held by Cod will be true, and infallibly so, and will not
suffer from any imaginable defects in the area of credentials.
At the beginning of this essay, 1 mentioned the fact that Plantinga sees
himself as describing the paradigm-center of our common notion of
knowledge by way of the core criterion for warrant. But when the discussion turns explicitly theistic, as it does in the third volume, one might want
the center of this paradigm to be occupied not by human knowledge, but
by Cod's knowledge. That is, suppose we argued in the following way:
Cod's knowledge is the center of our paradigm for knowledge: infallibly
and non-accidentally true, with no need to inquire into its history to evaluate its epistemic credentials, and so on. Cod's knowledge is the best, highest sort of knowledge we could possibly imagine. Our knowledge gets its
good credentials by way of being produced in a certain way: namely, in a
way captured by Plantinga's core criterion for warrant. But even when one
of 'our' beliefs has as much warrant, and is held as firmly, as is humanly
possible, it is still lower than any item of God's knowledge: it is not the
case, for example, that the proposition in question is true if and only if we
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know it, and our knowing it is essentially dependent upon God's knowing
and doing a great many things.
On this view, how would one evaluate a belief produced by a 'cognitive
process' such as the IlHS? It certainly seems to me that the mere fact that
the belief is implanted in a person directly by God gives this belief good
credentials. In fact, it seems to me that the credentials of a belief produced
in this way, while they may not be as impressive as items of God's own
knowledge, will be more impressive than those of beliefs produced by our
own cognitive faculties (I certainly think of God as more reliable than my
own memory, or faculty of a priori knowledge, or ability to reason ... ). In
fact, I find it difficult to imagine better credentials for an item of human
knowledge besides its being produced directly by God. If beliefs produced
by our co~,'nitive faculties deserve to be called knowledge when they display satisfactory epistemic credentials, then beliefs produced directly by
God, it seems to me, have even more right to the title-whether or not they
satisfy the criterion for warrant as this applies to the productions of our
cognitive faculties. So beliefs produced by something like the IIHS will be
warranted, and if held firmly enough will constitute knowledge-and this
without an analogical extension of the core criterion for warrant to cognitive processes in general.
A few possible misunderstandings concerning this alternative suggestion can be averted by drawing attention to the fact that the proposal I am
advancing here is fairly modest in scope. For example, I am not proposing
a replacement for Plantinga's IIHS as the source of the Christian's knowledge of the truths of Christianity. L am merely offering an alternative
account of why beliefs produced in the way specified by the TlHS are warranted. Nothing about my proposal suggests that God works any differently than the way Plantinga suggests when instilling faith in individuals.
My proposal makes no particular claims about whether or when God actually does instill beliefs in individuals, merely discussing the epistemic status of beliefs thus produced.
It might be thought that my proposal makes Scripture inessential to the
process whereby individuals come to know the truths of Christianity,
whereas on Plantinga's original proposal Scripture is essential. It seems to
me, however, that on both Plantinga's and my accounts, Scripture is essential to Christian knowledge only to the extent that God decides to make it
so. According to Planting a, Scripture is essential to the TIHS in the sense
that if Scripture is not involved in a particular instance of belief-production, then this will not turn out to be an instance of the IIHS. But nothing
about Plantinga's account suggests that God cannot bypass the IIHS altogether, and produce beliefs by way of another sort of cognitive process
(even in Christians), and if that cognitive process satisfies the core criterion
for warrant as expanded by (AEP), beliefs so produced will be warranted.
There is no particular reason to think that Cod could not engage in nonIIHS cognitive processes which would satisfy these requirements; in fact, it
is difficult to imagine a case where God directly inspires a true belief in an
individual that could not be described in such a way as to meet these
requirements. So on Plantinga's original description, Scripture is essential
to warranted Christian belief onJy to the extent that God makes it a policy
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only to produce belief in the truths of Christianity by way of the ITHS
rather than by other means.
So too on my proposal, if God has made it a policy only to inspire belief
in the truths of Christianity upon the occasion of those truths being read in
Scripture (that is, by way of the lIHS), then Scripture is essential to warranted Christian belief. But should God decide to produce beliefs directly in
individuals in a manner which bypasses Scripture, God can certainly do so,
and my proposal explains why beliefs produced in this manner will be warranted. 12
Another possible misunderstanding can be averted here by the reminder
that Plantinga's intent, which this proposal maintains, is to be thoroughgoinglyextemalist: it is no part of Plantinga's proposal to argue that human
beings have internal access to the fact of the matter about which of their
beliefs constitute knowledge. If a belief satisfies the core criterion, then it is
warranted, regardless of the believer's awareness of the belief's epistemic
merits. So too, my proposal does not involve any believers' being aware that
a particular belief has been implanted in them directly by God, and thus
does not involve an evaluation of the epistemic merits of a belief which a
believer merely takes to be the result of God's direct influence. And just as
celtainly, the proposal does not invite the thought that any believers could
justifiably claim to know a particular fact due to God's direct activity, and
thus with God's authority. Rather, the proposal specifies that in the cases in
question the beliefs in question have in fact been implanted directly by God,
regardless of the individual's own awareness (or lack thereof) of that fact. In
addition, nothing I have said suggests that beliefs produced directly by God
are not susceptible to 'intemalist' evaluation, defeat or undercutting, and so
on. On Plantinga's own proposal, warranted beliefs in general are susceptible to such challenges. So regardless of whether Plantinga's account or my
own of why beliefs produced by the IIHS are warranted is viewed as the
more plausible, Christian belief still faces the challenges of Freud and Marx,
historical criticism, postmodernism, pluralism, and so on. Plantinga argues
that all of these challenges can be met, and it seems to me that my alteration
to his proposal docs not significantly affect his arguments in this regard. 23
I take it that the line of thought I have proposed offers a way around the
difficulties involved in defending a principle such as (AEP). It offers
another way to achieve Plantinga's aim: to collapse de jure objections to
Christian belief into de facto objections. Beliefs implanted directly by God
will have a good deal of warrant, and if held strongly enough will constitute knowledge, whether or not this takes place by way of a cognitive
process which can be positively evaluated according to the criterion of
warrant which applies to our own cognitive faculties. Thus, if God (as
understood by Christianity) exists, and if God is in the business of instilling
faith (understood along the lines of Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin
model) in individuals, then Christian belief very likely amounts to knowledge. If the rest of Plantinga's arguments hold, then the only way to challenge this conclusion is to argue eitller that God does not exist, or that God
is not in the business of instilling faith. 2•
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NOTES

1. Warrant mzd Proper Fllllction (Oxford: Oxford Unin'rsity Press, 1993)
(hereafter WPF) pp. 46f.
2. Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
(hereafter WCB), p. 156.
3. Both in Warrallt and Current Epistemology (London: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1996): Lehrer, "Proper Function vs. Systematic Coherence", p. 36f.;
Plantinga, "Respondeo", pp. 338f.
4. WCB, p. 256.
5. As we have seen, a cognitive process can be quite spare: "God instills a
true belief in you, intending in doing so to instill in you a true belief" is cited as
a cognitive process by Plantinga himself in his response to Lehrer.
6. Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
(hereafter WCD) pp. 212f.
7. WCB, pp. 243ff.
8.
Reading the criterion strictly according to the letter would raise problems for Plantinga's proposed extension of the criterion. Imagine the following
scenario: if I am transported to a distant environment that is inappropriate for
my kind of cognitive faculties but in which I still have access to Scripture, then
if God inspired beliefs in the truths of the Gospel upon the occasion of my
reading Scripture (by way of the IIHS), then the resulting beliefs would not,
according to the criterion's original formulation, be warranted. In fact, God
collldn't create a cognitive process appropriate for that environment such that it
could produce warranted beliefs in me, since this wouldn't make the cognitive
environment suitable for my kind of cognitive faculties. God could, of course,
create a new cognitive faculty in me for which my new environment was
appropriate, in which case beliefs produced by this new faculty could have
warrant. The ITHS, however, is explicitly not a faculty but a process, and is in
no sense 'mine'.
9. As shown in Plantinga's discussion of mini-environments; see, for
example, WCB pp. 157ff.
10. Plantinga certainly appears to rely on just such a claim when he argues
(WCB pp. 257f.) that the beliefs produced by the IIHS, referred to in the text as
faith, are warranted, on the grounds that they satisfy the core criterion for warrant. He summarizes the argument thus: "Why, then, does faith constitute
knowledge? Because what one believes by faith satisfies the conditions that
are jointly sufficient and severally necessary for warrant." WCB p. 258.
11. WPF, p.7.
12. Plantinga explicitly denies that one need presuppose the existence of a
conscious designer (i.e. God) to make sense, and make use, of the notion of a
design plan. So if the observation of a teleology is sufficient for the ascription
of design, the fact that the radiation serves this function is sufficient to suppose
that a design plan governs its operation. Cf. WCB p. 154.
13. Nicholas Wolterstorff has noted that the process in question, even without the addition which I suggest above, looks in fact suspiciously like an internal human cognitive .fi7CUlty- the faculty of forming correct beliefs about the
presence of large gray objects when exposed to radiation of a certain typealbeit a faculty which remained unknown lmtil activated. If this is so, then on
the one hand this process will produce warranted beliefs, undercutting
Plantinga's original use of the example; but on the other hand, the process can't
be seen as an example of the analogical extension with which I take issue,
which undercuts my use of the example. The remaining examples, however,
clearly are not vulnerable to tl1is sort of reading.
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14. An even reasonably complete account of self-knowledge, say, would
require a book all by itself; and the same goes for the other main modules [of
our cognitive establishment]." WPF p. 48.
15. Ibid.
16. Plantinga describes his project in these terms in the "Preface" to WCB,
pp. vii-xvi.
17. That is, possesses those features of human cognitive faculties which
account for the success of the core criterion for warrant, and lacks any features
which we might think would render beliefs so produced lacking in warrant.
18. Cf. WPF ch. 8.
19. "Divine Knowledge", in Christian Perspectives on 1<eligious Knowledge,
edited by C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1993), p. 57.
20. Ibid., p. 63; italics original.
21. Ibid., p. 64.
22. I leave entirely open the question as to whether God has in fact set such
a policy. If God has done so, then of course this means that God does not
inspire beliefs in the truths of Christianity without Scripture'S being involved.
But if this were so, it would not necessarily mean that there could not be another source of warranted Christian belief (for example, the Sensus Divinitatis,
when functioning properly, will produce true beliefs about God, and the warrant-conferring ability of the Sensus will still be explained by appeal to
Plantinga's core criterion of warrant); nor would it imply that God does not
inspire true beliefs of other sorts in individuals, both Christian and non-. Such
questions are properly answered by reference to what God has decided to do;
the present proposal suggests merely that true beliefs produced by God in
these direct ways should be thought of as warranted.
23. Cf. WCB part IV.
24. I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, J. Todd Buras,
William Hasker and an anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy for comments on earlier versions of this essay.
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